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The media are increasingly fascinated by neuroscience. Here, we consider how neuroscientific discoveries
are thematically represented in the popular press and the implications this has for society. In communicating
research, neuroscientists should be sensitive to the social consequences neuroscientific information may
have once it enters the public sphere.Since the ‘‘Decade of the Brain,’’ the
field of neuroscience has expanded
dramatically, tackling increasingly com-
plex topics with profound social and
policy implications (Illes et al., 2003).
Neuroscience is now firmly rooted as a
basic reference point within the public
sphere, drawn into discussion of diverse
issues such as antisocial behavior,
economic decisions, substance abuse,
and education.
However, scientific information is
rarely transplanted intact into the public
domain. As science penetrates the public
sphere, it enters a dense network of
cultural meanings and worldviews and is
understood through the prism they
provide. The cultural context determines
which aspects of science travel into pub-
lic consciousness: knowledge that reso-
nates with prevailing social concerns is
selectively ‘‘taken up’’ in public dialogue.
For example, the ‘‘Mozart effect’’—the
empirically unsubstantiated idea that
classical music enhances children’s intel-
ligence (Pietschnig et al., 2010)—receives
most media coverage in areas with poorer
quality primary education, suggesting
that concern about early intellectual
development influences diffusion of the
idea (Bangerter and Heath, 2004). Fur-
thermore, scientific information acquires
newmeanings as cultural preconceptions
are projected onto it. For instance, Green
and Cle´mence (2008) demonstrate how
over the course of public communication,
a study linking vasopressin to affiliative
behavior in voles (Young et al., 1999)
was reconstituted as a discovery of the
‘‘faithfulness gene.’’ These lay ideas (or
‘‘social representations’’) of science can
have tangible societal consequences.220 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 ElsevierAttributing social behaviors to genetic
causes, for example, could have impor-
tant implications for ideas of determinism,
responsibility, and self-control. The public
attention afforded to the Mozart effect
provoked substantive legislative initia-
tives, with one US state passing a bill to
distribute classical music CDs to all
newborns (Bangerter and Heath, 2004).
It is therefore important to be attuned to
how scientific knowledge is represented
in the public sphere and to the conse-
quences these representations may have.
Contemporary neuroscience carries
particular social weight. In today’s secular
societies, the brain is an acutely signifi-
cant organ, represented as the seat of
mind and self (Rose, 2007). Conse-
quently, the production of brain-related
knowledge is culturally important, car-
rying implications for how people see
themselves as individuals and human
beings. Brain-based information pos-
sesses rhetorical power: logically irrele-
vant neuroscience information imbues
an argument with authoritative, scientific
credibility (McCabe and Castel, 2008;
Weisberg et al., 2008). Thus, the assimila-
tion of neuroscience into public con-
sciousness may have repercussions for
beliefs, attitudes, and behavior, and as
neuroscience grows in prominence, it is
necessary to cultivate awareness of how
it is mobilized in society.
There is currently little research ex-
ploring neuroscience’s public image. The
mass media are the main vectors in the
transmission of scientific research. To
date, systematic analysis of neuroscience
in the media has only addressed the area
of media coverage of specific neurotech-
nologies such as fMRI, PET, and TMSInc.(Racine et al., 2005, 2006, 2010). This
research identified three emerging
trends in media interpretations of neuroi-
maging. Neurorealism describes the use
of neuroimages to make phenomena
seem objective, offering visual proof that
a subjective experience (e.g., love, pain,
addiction) is a ‘‘real thing.’’ Neuroessenti-
alism denotes depictions of the brain as
the essence of a person, with the brain
a synonym for concepts like person, self,
or soul. Finally, neuropolicy captures the
recruitment of neuroscience to support
political or policy agendas.
These studies provide intriguing data,
but the exclusive focus on neurotechnolo-
gies restricts their scope. To be included
in the analysis, media articles had to
contain quite technical terms like fMRI or
PET: the research therefore overlooked
articles that discussed brain research
without naming specific technologies or
that used lay terms for them (e.g., ‘‘brain
scans’’). Here, we consider how brain
science, defined more generally, mani-
fests in the mainstream media.
Media Coverage of Neuroscience
To develop a comprehensive under-
standing of the portrayal of neuroscience
research in the mainstream media, we
conducted a search of the LexisNexis
news media database for articles discus-
sing brain research published between
January 1, 2000 and December 31,
2010. The search was circumscribed to
six national UK daily newspapers: the
Daily Telegraph, Times, Daily Mail, Sun,
Mirror, and Guardian. These comprise
the three best-selling broadsheets and
three best-selling tabloids in the UK and
span the political spectrum from right to
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(e.g., obituaries, television listings) were
removed, leaving a usable sample of
2,931 articles. These articles were sub-
jected to a content analysis, with articles
coded to reflect the subjects they con-
tained (see Table 1).
The data revealed that the number of
articles published per year climbed
steadily for most of the decade (Figure 1),
despite drops in 2007 and 2009. Table 1
displays the percentage of articles that
discussed different subjects. The most
frequent category of subjects to which
themedia referred was brain optimization:
43% of all articles discussed enhance-
ment of or threats to brain function.
Thirty-six percent of articles referred to
psychopathology, 24% to basic functions,
and 14% to applied contexts. Fourteen
percent discussed issues related to
parenthood and 12% individual differ-
ences, while sexuality and morality both
appeared in 11% of the sample.
Common Emerging Themes
Cutting across this content, three major
themes captured how neuroscience was
represented in the media. The first relied
on a framing of the brain as capital, i.e.,
a resource to be optimized. The second
employed the brain as an index of
difference, using neuroscience to delin-
eate boundaries between categories of
people. The third presented brain re-
search as biological proof of the legiti-
macy of particular phenomena or beliefs.
The Brain as Capital
Many articles evinced a representation of
the brain as a resource: as the repository
of the self and the source of all ability
and achievement. This was most evident
within the brain optimization category.
The brain was something to be acted on,
with readers advised to take action to
optimize brain performance.
Discussion of optimizing brain activity
manifested within two principal frames:
description of strategies to enhance the
brain above normal or baseline function
and identification of potential brain
threats. For enhancement, the most
common feature was recommendation
of foods that purportedly improved
neural function, and also mental activities
(e.g., ‘‘brain-training’’ software), artificial
methods (e.g., ‘‘smart pills’’), and physical
activity. Media articles rarely conveyedthat evidence for the efficacy of such
measures was equivocal (e.g., Kirby
et al., 2010; Owen et al., 2010). Articles
within the threat frame highlighted risks
posed by drugs and alcohol, mobile
phones, environmental toxins, and com-
puters. Both frames exhorted action on
the part of the reader, whether in uptake
of brain-enhancing activities or avoidance
of hazards.
The media advocated a regime of
self-discipline in the service of ‘‘boosting’’
brain function, portraying brain health as
a resource that demanded constant pro-
motion. There was no end point at which
optimal brain function could be deemed
achieved: brain function could be im-
proved limitlessly. Articles were perme-
ated with the vocabulary of physical
fitness, entreating the reader to ‘‘exer-
cise’’ or ‘‘train’’ their brain to keep it
‘‘active’’ and ‘‘flexible.’’
‘‘Research has shown that keeping
the mind agile is just as important
as keeping fit in the battle to stay
young. In fact, by stretching the
brain with regular crossword and
sudoku puzzles, you can make
your brain appear up to 14 years
younger.’’ (Daily Mail, September
13, 2005)
Brain optimization was also interlinked
with discussion of parenting. Parents
were advised to take action to promote
their children’s neurocognitive perfor-
mance. The brain was positioned as an
important reference point in child-rearing
decisions, recruited to indicate the
‘‘correctness’’ of parenting practices.
Parents were told, for example, that they
should give children fish oils to promote
academic success or limit computer
usage to attenuate the risk of attentional
difficulties. Pronouncements on parenting
practice acquired scientific authority
through claims that these practices had
specific effects on children’s brains. This
veneer of science, however, sometimes
concealed clear value judgments about
what constitutes ‘‘good’’ parenting.
‘‘As more mothers work, this is the
first generation to spend a large
part of its infancy in childcare
outside the home. Meanwhile,
neuroscientists warn that a lack ofNeuronlove and stability has a devastating
effect on children.’’ (Daily Tele-
graph, December 11, 2008)
In summary, prescribing actions
for optimizing brain performance was
a salient theme around which media
coverage of neuroscience assembled.
It communicated a view of brain health
as a resource that required constant
attention and calculated effort and was
drawn into discussion about childrearing
practices.
The Brain as an Index of Difference
The second theme captured the use
of neuroscientific findings to underline
differences between categories of people
in ways that were symbolically layered
and socially loaded. This theme was
most evident in articles within the cate-
gories psychopathology, sexuality, mo-
rality (particularly antisocial behavior),
and bodily conditions (particularly
obesity).
Articles devoted considerable space
to demonstrating male-female neurobio-
logical differences and also to evidence
that substance abusers, criminals, homo-
sexuals, obese people, and people with
mental health conditions had distinctive
brain types. The content of media
coverage of such groups tended to corre-
spond with the content of existing stereo-
types: for example, articles regularly
linked obesity to low intelligence, adoles-
cence to disagreeableness, and women
to irrationality.
‘‘Under stress or pressure,
a woman sees spending time talk-
ing with her man as a reward, but
a man sees it as an interference in
his problem-solving process. She
wants to talk and cuddle, and all
he wants to do is watch football.
To a woman, he seems uncaring
and disinterested and a man sees
her as annoying or pedantic. These
perceptions are a reflection of the
different organisation and priorities
of their brains.’’ (Daily Mail, January
16, 2008)
There was little room for ambiguity in
media portrayal of group-related brain
differences. It was common to encounter
the phrase ‘‘the [adjective] brain,’’ with
the brackets filled by categories like74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 221
Table 1. Subjects Addressed within Media Coverage of Neuroscience
Superordinate Subject Category Subject Code Percentage of Total
Brain optimization 43.4%
Enhancement of brain 28.3%
Threats to brain 16.5%
Psychopathology 36.1%
Dementia 16.3%
Addiction 7.2%
Mood disorders 5.5%
ASD and ADHD 4.9%
Schizophrenia 2.6%
Anxiety disorders 2%
Learning disabilities 1.8%
Eating disorders 0.9%
Personality disorders 0.4%
Basic functions 24.4%
Learning and memory 9.3%
Sleep 4.5%
Sensation and perception 4.3%
Emotion 4.2%
Attention and concentration 2.7%
Language and communication 2.4%
Consciousness 1.2%
Applied contexts 13.6%
Education 3.3%
Economic activity 2.7%
Music and art 2.5%
Business and workplace 1.6%
Military and policing 1.5%
Law 1.3%
Driving 0.9%
Politics 0.7%
Sport 0.6%
Parenthood 13.5%
Parenting 7.6%
Pregnancy 6.7%
Breastfeeding 1.1%
Individual differences 12.2%
Mood 5.9%
Intelligence 4.5%
Personality 2%
Talent 0.9%
Sexuality 11.2%
Gender differences 6%
Sexual behavior 4.6%
Romantic relationships 2.8%
Sexual orientation 0.9%
Morality 10.5%
Antisocial behavior 6.9%
Empathy 1.9%
Lying 1.2%
222 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.
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Table 1. Continued
Superordinate Subject Category Subject Code Percentage of Total
Moral beliefs 1%
Prejudice 0.9%
Prosocial behavior 0.6%
Selfishness and egocentrism 0.5%
Bodily conditions 8.4%
Body size and obesity 5%
Pain 3.1%
Placebo effect 0.5%
Futuristic phenomena 3.7%
Mind reading 2.3%
Cyborgs and chimeras 1.5%
Thought control 0.5%
Spiritual experiences 3.3%
Alternative therapies 1.3%
Paranormal 1.2%
Religion 1.1%
The LexisNexis database was searched for articles whose headline, lead paragraph, or indexing contained either the term ‘‘brain’’ or ‘‘neurosci!’’ (the
truncation of a search term with an exclamation mark retrieves all variations on the root term, e.g., neuroscience, neuroscientist), along with the word
‘‘research.’’ Articles were imported into the data analysis program ATLAS.ti and subjected to content analysis. A coding frame was developed that
captured the range of subjects present, and each article was coded to reflect the subjects it contained. The unit of coding was the individual article.
Codes were not exclusive, i.e., one article could have multiple codes attached to it, according to its contents. This table displays the percentage of
articles that contained each code, with codes grouped into superordinate ‘‘umbrella’’ categories.
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dicted,’’ or ‘‘gay.’’ This implied the exis-
tence of a single brain type common
across all members of the category and
distinctly different from the brains of the
categorical alternatives. Social groups
were essentialized and portrayed as
wholly internally homogeneous.
‘‘Addiction is viewed as a mental
disorder, and gays are known to be
at higher risk of anxiety, depression,
self-harm, suicide and drug abuse.
Most studies suggest that these
problems are brought on by years
of discrimination and bullying.
But there is another controversial
thesis—that gays lead inherently
riskier lives. Gambling stimulates
the dopamine system in the brain;
illicit drugspepup the samesystem.
Are gays dopamine junkies?’’
(Times, December 18, 2006)
The emphasis on group differences had
particularly important implications for
laying boundaries between the normal
and the pathological. The brains typical
of certain pathological categories were
repeatedly contrasted with the brains of‘‘normal’’ or ‘‘healthy’’ people. Detail
about what exactly constituted normality
was not provided. What was clear, rather,
was what ‘‘normal’’ people were not:
they were not criminal, overweight,
homosexual, or mentally ill. The bound-
aries between normal and pathological
categories were portrayed as particularly
rigid when the pathological phenomenon
in question had a moral dimension.
Emphasizing such groups’ neurobiolog-
ical deviance may serve the function of
symbolically distancing the ‘‘normal’’
majority from the morally contaminated
phenomenon.
‘‘The brains of paedophiles may
work differently from others, scien-
tists claimed yesterday. They found
distinct differences in brain activity
among adults who had committed
sexual offences involving young
children.’’ (Daily Mail, September
25, 2007)
Although separating the normal and
abnormal was important in the data, also
present (though less prominent) was
discussion of neuroscience in ways that
elided the normal-abnormal split. ThisNeuronoften involved co-opting previously
normal behaviors and feelings into the
pathological domain. A common example
was the application of the terminology of
addiction to a wide range of everyday
behavioral domains, from shopping to
computers, sex, chocolate, exercise,
adventure sports, and sunbathing.
‘‘Brain-imaging scientists have
discovered why breaking up can
be so hard to do: the neurologists
say that it is because pining after
your lost love can turn into a physi-
cally addictive pleasure.’’ (Times,
June 28, 2008)
Thus, media coverage of neurobiolog-
ical differences reinforced divisions
between social groups and was pre-
sented in stereotype-consistent ways.
Delineating the boundary between the
normal and the pathological was an
underlying concern in many articles, but
some subverted this to blur the normal-
abnormal boundary and portray
commonplace activities as pathological.
The Brain as Biological Proof
The final theme captures the deployment
of neuroscience to demonstrate the74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 223
Figure 1. Number of Neuroscience-Related Articles Published per Year in the Popular Press
The number of neuroscience-related articles published in the six newspapers increased across the
decade, almost doubling between 2000 and 2006. This growth was disrupted by a slight drop in 2007
and a more pronounced decline in 2009, though 2010 saw article volumes return to their earlier heights.
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ular beliefs or phenomena. This was pre-
sented as evidence of their validity and
was sometimes used for rhetorical effect.
This theme traversed most of the code
categories but was particularly salient
within applied contexts, basic functions,
sexuality, and spiritual experiences.
The brain operated as a reference
point on which the reality of contested or
ephemeral phenomena was substanti-
ated. For example, religious experiences,
medically puzzling health conditions, and
supernatural phenomena were reconsti-
tuted as manifestations of neural events.
This validated the existence of such expe-
riences—people who have experienced
them are not deluded or hysterical—
through bringing them into the physical
domain and divesting them of their ethe-
real or contested qualities.
‘‘But rather than being a brush with
the afterlife, near-death experi-
ences may simply be caused by
an electrical storm in the dying
brain.’’ (Daily Mail, May 31, 2010)
In social discourse, what is ‘‘natural’’ is
often equated with what is just or right:
implicit in the descriptive ‘‘is’’ statement224 Neuron 74, April 26, 2012 ª2012 Elsevieris a normative ‘‘ought’’ statement. The
potential for neuroscience to establish
biological causality therefore made it a
potent rhetorical resource. In pointing to
a phenomenon’s neural correlates, jour-
nalists could portray themselves as dis-
passionate observers demonstrating the
simple fact of that phenomenon’s rightful
place in the natural order. For example,
research indicating that people have
cognitive difficulty with ‘‘multitasking’’
(Rubinstein et al., 2001) was used to
assert that productive female participa-
tion in both the labor market and family
life is neurobiologically impossible.
‘‘Superwoman has been rumbled.
Juggling a career, a family and an
active social life is quite literally a
waste of time, according to scien-
tists. A study reveals today that
attempting several tasks at once is
inefficient and could even be
dangerous. The findings challenge
the notion of women ‘having it all.’’’
(Daily Telegraph, August 6, 2001)
Elucidating the neurobiological corre-
lates of a phenomenon was often pre-
sented as comprising a full explanation
of its existence. However, the actualInc.explanatory power of the biological
information alone was often imperfect.
This was apparent when neuroscience
studies of specific functions in controlled
environments were extended to explain
complex, idiosyncratic, and historically
contingent phenomena. For example,
research on the analgesic effects of
religious beliefs was used to explain how
religious martyrs endure torture (Daily
Telegraph, September 9, 2008); the
tenacity of historical figures like Winston
Churchill and Emmeline Pankhurst was
attributed to their alleged possession of
a gene linked to stubborn behavior (Daily
Mail, January 3, 2008); and a study
showing that informational overload can
‘‘crowd out’’ empathy was presented as
evidence that social networking websites
like Twitter ‘‘rob people of compassion’’
(Daily Mail, June 3, 2009). These were
examples of overextensions of research,
with implications drawn far outside the
original research context. This overex-
trapolation of research was not limited to
idle speculation but sometimes extended
to calls for concrete applications.
‘‘Daniel Amen, a psychiatrist and
owner of a chain of private brain-
scanning clinics, has suggested in
the US press that all presidential
candidates should have their grey
matter probed. This, he suggests,
would help to steer clear of a future
AdolfHitler (cursedwith ‘faulty brain
wiring’) or SlobodanMilosevic (who
suffered ‘poor brain function’).’’
(Times, January 7, 2008)
Thus, thematerial nature of neuroscien-
tific explanations offered considerable
rhetorical power. Neuroscience research
wasapplied tobringuncertainphenomena
into material reality and to ‘‘prove’’ the
legitimacy of arguments or social norms,
sometimes involving extension of findings
beyond their domain of relevance.
The Representation of
Neuroscience in the Media
Is Changing
Our content analysis suggests that over
the first decade of the 21st century, media
coverage of brain research intensified and
was applied to a wide variety of subjects.
The range of subject matter was broader
than that reported previously (Racine
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feature is the focus on brain optimization,
which emerged strongly from the present
data but did not manifest in Racine et al.’s
studies of neurotechnologies (Racine
et al., 2010). Although clinical applications
retained an important position in our
sample, neuroscience was more com-
monly represented as a domain of knowl-
edge relevant to ‘‘ordinary’’ thought and
behavior and immediate social concerns.
Brain science has been incorporated
into the ordinary conceptual repertoire of
the media, influencing public under-
standing of a broad range of events and
phenomena.
As neuroscience has assimilated into
the cultural register, it has been appropri-
ated by a society structured by diverse
interests. The themes around which the
media oriented their discussions of
neuroscience demonstrate how estab-
lished cultural concerns and values can
be projected onto scientific knowledge.
The language and substantive content of
the ‘‘brain as capital’’ theme echo the
central ethos of contemporary discourse
on health, with its strong focus on indi-
vidual responsibility and lifestyle choices
(Crawford, 2006). Theoristshaveattributed
the rise of the individualized model of
health to the opportunities it offers for
achieving and displaying self-control,
which stands as a cardinal value in
Western society. Joffe and Staerkle´
(2007) decompose the value of self-control
into control over three domains of
self-hood: body, mind, and destiny.
In secularized and scientized cultures, the
brain fuses all three domains: an individual
who engages in brain-training activities to
protect against dementia, for example, is
simultaneously working to fortify their
physical brain, phenomenological self,
and future life situation. The brain thereby
offers a new site on which cultural
demands to achieve and display self-
control can be satisfied. The data intimate
that brain science has been subsumed
into a cultural value system that represents
self-control and individual responsibility
as necessary conditions for achieving
physical health and for establishingoneself
as a virtuous and disciplined citizen.
Meanwhile, neuroscience was also
drawn into the culturally loaded enterprise
of establishing social identities. Delin-
eating the boundaries of social groups isa perpetual social concern, and modern
science has been key in establishing the
‘‘kinds’’ of people in society (Hacking,
1995). The relationship between the brain
and contemporary understandings of
personhood may make neuroscience
a particularly efficient classificatory
instrument. Racine et al. (2005) termed
the equation of brain and identity neuro-
essentialism, and it is instructive to relate
this to social psychological literature on
essentialism. Wagner et al. (2009) define
essentialism as the attribution of a group’s
behavior to an unalterable, causal
‘‘essence’’: the group comes to be seen
as a natural category that is internally
homogeneous and strictly bounded. The
content of the ‘‘brain as an index of
difference’’ theme conforms to these
indicators of essentialism. Research has
linked essentialistic representations of
social groups to stigmatizing processes
in domains like race, gender, sexual
orientation, mental illness, and obesity
(Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011). The con-
currence of the concepts of brain and
identity in contemporary society may
make popular neuroscience a potent
engine for essentialism, and its influence
on intergroup relations should be a future
focus of empirical investigation.
Finally, the ‘‘brain as biological proof’’
theme demonstrates how neuroscience
can be recruited as a rhetorical tool to
advance certain agendas. The media
data provide a naturalistic analog to
experimental findings that brain-based
information confers a scientific aura that
obscures an argument’s substantive
content (Weisberg et al., 2008). The ability
to simulate coherent ‘‘scientific’’ explana-
tions through cursory reference to the
brain meant that neuroscience was ex-
ploited for rhetorical effect. Due to the
size and range of the media sample, it
was impossible to directly compare
media coverage with the corresponding
neuroscience research to precisely estab-
lish the extent they diverged. However, it
seemed clear that research was being
applied out of context to create dramatic
headlines, push thinly disguised ideolog-
ical arguments, or support particular
policy agendas.
What Should Neuroscientists Do?
The thematic representation of neurosci-
ence in the media we present offersNeurona potentially useful resource for neurosci-
entists engaged in public communication
of their research. If scientists are aware
of the issues and contexts into which
their research might be subsumed, they
can explicitly address what their research
implies (or does not imply) for these areas.
Rather than a one-way flow of information
in which scientists passively impart ‘‘the
facts’’ in a press release, the public
engagement process thus becomes a
dialogue in which scientists interact with,
influence, and are influenced by society.
Awareness of the public impact of
neuroscientific information should also
be encouraged within the policy sphere.
Incorporation of neuroscientific evidence
into policy debate should be closely
monitored to ensure that the contribu-
tion is substantive rather than purely
rhetorical and that neuroscientific
evidence is not used as a vehicle for
espousing particular values, ideologies,
or social divisions.
Neuroscience does not take place in a
vacuum, and it is important to maintain
sensitivity to the social implications,
whether positive or negative, it may have
as it manifests in real-world social con-
texts. It appears that the brain has been
instantiated as a benchmark in public dia-
logue, and reference to brain research is
now a powerful rhetorical tool. The key
questions to be addressed in the coming
years revolve around how this tool is em-
ployed and the effects this may have on
society’s conceptual, behavioral, and
institutional repertoires.REFERENCES
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